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On　the　materiality　of　thixotropic　slogans
Joff　Peter　Norman　Bradley
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Abstract
　　　　As　a　contribution　to　the　ct“itique　of‘pl’agrnatic「commullicatiolls　theoi’y．
this　paper　introduces　Deleuze　and　Guattari　’g．　heterodox　pel’formative　theory　of
the　ordeトword（nrot　d’∂1’d”の，　It　will　be　seen　that　the　order－word　as　a　command
or　slogan　implicit　in　speecll　acts　plays　a　celltripetal　role　ill　a　pragmatics
of　enunciation　which　charts　a　course　between　the　Saussurean　Scylla　alld
Chomskyan　Charybdis．　The　paper　will　proceed　to　a　conclug．　ion　whicll　considers
the　linlitative　and　expansive　nature　of　the　order－word　as　an　articulatioll　and
function　of　the　strata．　I　will　consider　the　password　as　a　corollary　to　the　order－
word　and　thillk　it　as　consistent　with　Blanchoピs　1770tS　d‘・〈／6∫θ”ゴ1’e．　I　w川then
argue　that　despite　efforts　to　articulate　a　positive　theory　of　the　password　by
Lingis（2004）、　the　thixoti’opic，　paint－like　Ilature　of　the　line　of　flight　that　tlle
password　embarks　upon　is　soon　recuperated　by　the　ordering　forces　of　the
societies　of　control（Deleuze41995），
Genealogy　of　the　order・word
　　　　Although　the　idea　of　the　order－word　is　derived廿om　Elias　Canettピs　C1ン川’‘／∫
α1～∂Pρv・v‘・”（1962）、and　denotes　the　fur）ction　of　la119uage　as〔he　establishnlellt　of
collective　order，　it　is　fi　rst　mentioned　by　Deleuze　in　his　monograph　Bet　lg　so〃isnl
（1988）、Considering　the　nature　ofρ’・ohienis．　Deleuze　states〔hat　order－words
uset　up「1’eady－made　opjnions　and　perceptions（p．15）．　He　rel1．｜arks〔hat　it　is　as
if　such　problems　were　drawn　fronl　a　bureaucraピs　administrative　fil▲ng　cabinet
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as　shrink－wrapped　issues　to　be　quickly　and　easl）y　resolved．　Equa1）y．　s．　oci　al
institutions　such　as　educarion　and　lallguage　itself　force　the　populace　to　’solve「
dhem，　They　set　the　parameters　of　the　thinkable．　From　tllis　tllere　is　but’a　thin
margill　of　tlreedoni’（p．15）．　Obversely。　Deleuze　collsiders　that　ti・ue　freedom　is
the　powel’to　decide　alld　constitute　problems　themselves．　Deleuze　is　iiitei’ested
in　forms　o．f　irlve，lltioll　and　creativit｝i　which　think　the　inaugural．　that　is　to　say，
experiments　which　are　without　pre－existing　iiianit’es　to　or　progralnnle．　It　il　Ilot　a
question　of　fillding　or　discovering　the　solution　but　of　mventing　it．　ln　D（’ P　bノ’eノ～（τ
〈η｝（．1　Repetition（1994）．　De｝euze　suggests　we　remain　slaves　to　problems　if　we　do
not　control　or　possess　a　right　to　theni　or　participate　in　their　management（P．158）．
　　　　There　are　clear　parallels　llere　between　Deleuze　and　Guattari’s　and　Bakhtin’s
notion　on　slogans　whell　the　former　discu∬the　term　in　relation　to　Leni】ゴs
　　　　　　　　　　　一
pamphlet　On　Slogans　in、4τhot｛scii～‘1　P～‘ueaus日987）．　The　slogan’All　power
to　the　Soviets’is　read　as　effective　within　concrete　clrcums〔ances　of　the　critical
time　priol’to　the　Russian　Revolution．　For　Lecercle（2002）、　the　illocutionary
tjmeliness　of　this　slogan　produces　a　perlocutiollary　truth　as　its　Cズアどc～（P」70）．
In　a　similar　manmer．　Bakhtin　makes　refe｜・ences　to　the　significance　of　indirect
discourse　for　dialogism　ill　his　1）ノ’θb～en’ls　iノ～D（）st∂｝’ei’sた｝”s∬）oeri（1s（198D．
Bakhtin　also　contends　that　a　soc▲ally　significallt　verbal　perfolnlance　possesses
the　capacity　to」infect　with　its　own　iTltelltion　certahl　aspects　of　lallguageや（p、290）．
If　the　comparison　bears　close　analysis、　wha〔is　novel　in　Deieuze　and　Guattari　is
amore　comprehensive　analysis　of　the　working　of　power　and　control　ill　relation
to　their　infringement　upon　the　body，　After　all，　the　slogan　was　origina】！y　a’war
cry’、’adesire　which　belongs　to　the　infrastructure’（Deleuze　and　Guattari．　1983、
p．ll4）、　We　can　also　de〔ect　here　a　reworking　and　extension　of　Benveniste「s
model　of　the　pelイorlllative（正97　D　in　Deleuze　and　Guattari’s　pragmatics．　Deleuze
alld　Guattari　grant　the　perfomative　a　structural　role　in　the　collective　assemblage
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of　enunciation．　which　is　all　intl’illsic　con｜ponent　of　the　abs〔ract　machiiie　of
lallguage．　Language　is　formed　thl℃11gh　collstl’aints　oll　word　formanoll　made
directly　through　the　e．ffect　of　group　menlbership　on　individuals，　The　order－
word　then　expl’e∬es　Lthe　habi〔s　of　speech　of　a　social　collective’｜・ather　than　the
gestures　of　a　solitary．　brooding．　intentional　and　phenomenological　suヒ，ject〈see
Boundas　in　Pro紀vi．2005、p．435｝．
　　　　Tied　tQ　this　is　Foucaulピs　analysis　of～〃θ〃（’（s（1972♪or’sel’ious　speech
acts＾ iDreyfus　and　Rabinow．1982｝．　Here、　the　order－word、　which　is　not　defined
as　a　function　of　a　single　killd　of　statement　as　i．t　is　with　Austin　d962）、　is　all
integral　part　of　the　assenlblage（a、qen（’en7ei～θof　ideas　such　as　indirect　discoしlrse．
incorporeal　transformation（a　term　borrowed　from　the　Stoics）and　collective
assemblage　of　enunciation（a，gen（’eme〃t　c（ノ〃e（』rゲゴ㌘ηoη（1↓‘〃～oJI），　Foucauldian
speech　acts　are　interpreted　as　disclosing　the　history　of　ti’ul／h　judgemellts　not　ill
the　ordinary　sense　of　the　cataloguing　of　the　verisimilitude　of　truth　claims　bul
through　a　genesis　ol“genealogy．　Foucault　thinks　that　incorporeal　transtonnations．
－as　mallifested　through　order－words－are　discurs．　ively　consritutive　of　what　is
meant　by　the‘crimina1「or　the’mad＾at　a　particular　juncture　in　history．
　　　　The　order－word　is　defilled　as　a　series　of　regulated　pattems　formed　through
an　ontological　mixture　of　bodies、　institutions　and　discourses（Lecercle、20｛〕2）．
which　combille　to　foTnl　the　complex　notion　of　a　pragmatic　re－interpretation　of
the　illocutionary　speech　act　and　its　perlocutiollaly　effects、　that　is　to　say，　effects
wh▲ch　persuade，　cajole、　frighten　and　illspire、　According　to　Lecercle（2005．
p．74）．the　theory　views　interlocutioll　as　quintessentially　cl，go／lic　and　expressive
of’・a／．り）ρ〃de　，fb1てぞ∫（power　struggle　or　differentlal　rel．ation　bet、、・een　forces）．　For
Butler、　the　su句ect　is　the　effect　of　power’ill　reco▲1’（1997．　p．6）．As　such，　gender．
she　contends．　is　a　construct　or　all　efi’ect　of　incorpol’eal　transformation，　a　capture
of　the　body　from　the　insertion　of　order－words　into　rhe　subject’s　actiolls．　Order一
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words　or　slogans　ellgnlee1’incorporeal　transformaliolls　through　bodies　and　only
由rough　bodies．
The　performative　and　the　imperative
　　　　The　performative　is　pl’ior　to　the　constative　or　declarative、　the　assertion
or　the　intelT）eltation：the　imperativ「e　insinuated　in　the　perfornlance　is　prior　to
the　suヒ，．iect．　At　work　i111anguage　is　the　perforlllative　or　violent　fuTICtiOll　of　the
order－word．　The　key　to　understanding　this　is　to　see　that　meaning，　intention　and
interpretation　are　1・eplaced　with　the　notion　of　capillary　power　and　embedded
relations　of　power．　Insinuated　among　I’elations　of　power　the　linguistic　cogito’I
speak’is　decentred．　The‘it　speaks’domillates　utterances．　In　a　rather　peculiar
sense、　the　collective　assemblage　of　enunciation　speaks　the　speaker（Lecercle．
2002．p．88）．
　　　　Indeed，　for　Deleuze　and　Guattari、　a’generar　pragmatics　takes　precedence
over　rival　models　of　Iinguistics　such　as　sernantics　because，　it　is　argued，　they　fail
to　account　for　alternative　一　geneaological　modes　of　analysis．Writing　separately、
Guattari（20　U），　in　making　the　case　for　incorporating　signifying　semiologies
into　a　more　general　pragmatics、　says：
［W］hile　engaging　with　the　Anglo－Anlericall　tradition，　p1’agmatics　should　stop
being　considered　a　great　suburb　of　syntax　and　s．　em　antics；while　engaging　the
Franco－European　tl’aditめn、　it　should　stop　being　considered．　a　sub－discipline　of
lillguistics（P．335）．
Pragn⊥atics　is　the　presupposition　behind　all　of　the　other　dimensions　and
’insinuates　itself　into　everything’（Deleuze　and　Guaftar輻1987，　p、7｝．　Moreover、
the　order－word－which　according　to　Lydenberg（1987），　bears　close　resemblance
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to　William　Burroughs’　word　viru：（p．129）－as　it　desci“ibes　words　as　viral　elltities
in　a　literal　or　metollymic、　non－me1aphorical　sense．　The　order－“’ord　fomls　part
of・Rll　assen⊃blage　of　ideas　such　as　indi1⇔ecr　discoursejncorporeal　tranl　fornlation
and　collective　assemblage　of　enunciation　which　combine　to　form　the　cfmlplex
notion　of　a　pragmatics　of　the　per】ocutionary　alld▲llocutionary　speech　act、　defined
as　the　set　of　lvirtual－rear　order－words　in　a　given　society（De▲euze　and　GuattarL
l987、　p．IlO）．　The　illocutionary・・the　enullciation　of　a　statement　or　al］act　that
modifies　the　relation　g．　hip　betweell　two　speakers－is　theretore　constitutive　of　the
pe1’locutionary　which　is　conventional！y　deemed　exrernal，
　　　　Austinls　speech　ac口heory　d962）is　reworked　to　describe　the　order－word
in　several　ways　as　a　kind　of　commandment，　slogan　or　imperative　for　action．
One　might　thlnk　of　it　as　somehow　operative　on　both　symbolic　and　concrete
power　structure　levels　conferring　orders　to　a　body　of　individuals．　It　fomls　an
integral　part　of　the　assauh　oll　thピmolar’ 垂窒?唐浮垂垂盾唐奄狽奄盾獅刀@of　lillguistics　alld
lays　the　groundwork　for　Deleuze　and　Gua．ttarゼs　affirmation　ofパmolecular’
hnguisncs　of　variation．　This　derives　much　of　its　geneologico－linguistic　r’igour
and　impo貢from　the　following：DLabov　q972），　who　stresses　variable　1’ules
alld　hetel’ogeneity　in　language；2）C．S．　Peirce（193D，　who　Deleuze　and　Guattari
describe　as已the　true　invenior　of　semiotics’（Deleuze，1987，　p．53D；3）the
critique　of　tlle　Althusserian　concept　of　ideology（Lecercle，2006）；4）and　a　host
of　influences　from　Benveniste〔1971）、　Bakhrin（1973），　Hjelmslev（1953）and
JakobSOII　d　980）．
　　　　Drawing　on　the　pragmatism　of　C．S．　Peirce，　Deleuze　and　Guattari　contend
that　linguistics　lleeds　praglnatics　to　isolate　the　condition　of　possibil▲ty　and　the
usage　of　the　linguis｛ic　elements（1987，　p．85）．　As　Deleuze　is　interested　in　ihe
conditions　of　possibihty　of　language　and　linguistic　signs，　as　well　as　the　relations
of　forces　enveloped　in　signs，　it　is　argued　that　there　is　no　lallguage　intellig▲ble
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outside　of　a　generalised　pragmatics、　which　is　to　say　that　non－analogical
expressions　are　inextricably　entangled　with　the　powers　of　the　heterogeneous
world　or　the　collect▲ve　arrallgemellt　of　enunciation．
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　L
　　　　　This　praglllatisnl　or　transcendenta▲empiricigL　m－that　is　to　say　the　disclosure
of　the　enipirical　conditiolls　of　possibility　of　thought－is　less　concerned　with　the
meaning　of　signs　alld　their　representations　than　with　sigll　and　its　a－s　ignification、
its　affect　and　funcrioning，　Tlle　connected　sigll　qua　expression　is　dispersed　amid
aseries　of　concrete　arrangements．　So　the　iso1飢ed‘1「therefore　asks　of　the　forces
which　compel　it　to　think　qlta　1ρ∫dひ’．
　　　　　Moreover．　siglls　are　re－1’ead　alongside　Spinoza吋s　notion　of’expression’
（Deleuze、1990）．　The　power　of　signs　is　interpreted　as　an　illusion　ill　col）usion
with　the　order　of　tlle　signlfier、　the　transcendental　law　and　so　oll．　In　a　gambit
to　transcend　the　horizon　of　images　of　death　and　negativity　and　to　undermine
Sauss．　ure－intlected　semiotics　and　the　Chomskyan　linguistic　paradigm，　the
problem　of　expression　and　expressivity　is　rethought　in　ternls　of　an　engilleering
issue，　a　linguistic　theory　of　nlachillic　pragmatism　which　cartographically　sets
out　a　semiotics　of　the　clinical　alld　critical．　Emphasising　the　notion　of　variation
and　cllange，　Deleuze　and　Guattari　mischievously　declare：’LYou　will　ne、’er
find　a　homogeneous　system　that　is　llot　still　or　already　affected　by　a　regulated、
contiltuoug．，illmlanel］t　process　of　variation（why　doe．s　Chomsky　pretend　not　to
understand　this？｝”（1987．　p．103｝．　We　call　see　here　that　Deleuze　and　Guattari
are　ainling　to　oust　the　notion　of　representation　and　the　problem　of　signs　and
their　signification　with　a　series　of　Spinozan－inflected　problems　pel‘tainil）g　to　the
expressed　and　the　expressioIエSo　the　question　becomes　one　of　illvelltioll　and
creation、　a　matter　ot’　machinic　relay：what　anl　I　affected　by　and　what　do　I　affect？
Through　the　prism　of　Spillozian　ethics，　Deleuze　perceives　g．　ig　ns　as　indicative　of
joyful　or　sad　afi’ects：an　evaluation　is　taken　in　terms　of　whether　signs　increase　or
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decrease　the　powers　of　livin9．
　　　　　The　order－word　receives　its　fullest　explicatien　ln　the　chapter’Poslulales
of　Linguistics‘in　Aτノ～θttSCI’～‘∫P～at‘・α1．t．s’d987）．　At　the　heart　of　this　argumellt
　　　　　　」　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　」
are　four　issues　which　assess　the　followil19：D　bnguage　as　infonnahollal　and
conimunicational；2）the　abstract　nlachille　of　lallguage　and　ils　relation　to
extl’illsic　factors；3）the　田ijversals　of　language　and；4）the　scientific　study　of
lallguage　under　the　conditions　of　a　standard　or　nlajol’language（1987、　p」OD，
This　e∬ay　focus　on　the　first　and　third　notions，　For　Deleuze　and　Guattari、　the
’building　brick’ヤ（Lecercle、2005．　p、71）of　language　is　Ilot　the　predicative
sentence　or　as　sertion　but　the　order－word、　the’elementary　ullit　of　language’
（Deleuze　and　Guattari　l987，　p、7）．　It　is　a　function　’coextensive　with　language‘，
with　a　fallen　or　silent　state　of　language－alld　carries　more　fundanlental　import
than　subjects　or　siglls、　communication　or　inforlnatlon．　The）atter　is　but　the
‘millimal　condition’（Deleuze　and　Guattari，1987．　p．79）for　the　transmission　of
order．WOrds．
　　　　The　order－word　then　is　undersωod　as　the　implicit　speech　act、　a
nolldiscursive　presupposition　of　a　statement（ざ〃θ〃cの（Deleuze　and　Guattari．
1987，p、77），　which　alongside　speech　acts　form　the　order－word．　Expressions
al’e　overcoded　by　impel否sonal　collective　assemblages．1ike　the　mallipu1飢or　of
PuPPets　in　marionette　theatre．　while　statements　are　individuated　in　the　sense　that
the　collective　assemblage　prepares　them　to　be　transmitted．　They　are　anonymous
for　they　are　quickly　relayed　on－no　olle　takes　responsibiljty　for　them．　This　idea
reflects　Beneviste“s　conception　of　sub．jectivity　in　lallguage．　which　considers
language　as　prepanllg　enlpty　forms　which　the　speaker　adopts　il｝the　constitution
of　the　person（1971，P．227）．　For　Belleviste，1anguage　is　pl’imarily　imperg．　onal，　a
kind　of　ur－text　or　ursprache、　as　it　is　the　condit▲oll　of　the　subject　when　personal
prollouns　are　used．　The　subject　ollly　takes　up　the　site　of　subjectivity　by
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iilcol’pOI’atillg　tl｝e　illlpel’sollal　alld＞enコpty　fornls『oi’language．
　　　　Language、　which　does　not　represent　but　rather　circulates、　is　not　the
medium　of　commullication　of　new　informatioll　but　more　primordially　pertains
to　the　bark▲ng　of　1～ノ～、gピ1’「ノ7g　words．　The　function　of　language　is　I『ather　to　emit
’impulsions’．　dorn）ant　commands　which　convey　llo　understanding　as　such　but
instead　encapsulate　minlature‘death　selltences’（Deleuze　and　Gしlattari、1987，
p．88）or　little　Istillgsl　or　’stingg．　of　command吋（Canetti，1962、　p、351）．　Deleuze　and
Guattari　give　the　exanlple　of　the　lion’s　roar　III　Canetti’s　analysis　of　comnlands
inσo賦‘7〃‘∫Pご）la’e”as　an　order－w・ord　and　describe　it　’in　terms　of　affective
intensity」ndeed，　Brian　Massunti、　a　translator　of　Deleuze　alコd　Guattari．　argues
that　as　the〃～ot　d’o’“dj’e　nleans’slogaパor‘（military）password’ill　modem
French．　Deleuze　and　Guattari　use　the　idea　to　literally　mealゴword　of　o1≒der’，
tha杜s　to　say，　they　contend　that　it　commands　a　double　sense　of　also　creating　a
political　order（Massunli　ill　Deleuze　alld　Guattari．1987．　p523）．　It　can　be　said
that　the　order－word　pertains　to　a　command　for　action　given　by　both　a　symbolic
alld　concrete　power　structure（an　army）to　a　large　group　of　individuals．　The
word　a．lso　designates　the　power　wielded　ill　a　political　party　or　union．111　tlle
essay‘Deleuze　and　signs「，　Cololnbat　argues　that　the　illocutionary，“subtends’the
locutionary（see　Mafks　alld　Buchanan．2000，　p．16）．
　　　　The　order－word　is　referred　to　as　a　conlmand．judgement　and　death　sentence
and　fUllCtiOlls　through　the　redundancy　of　its　signification．　Order－words　are
spectraL　They　exist　long　after　their　mitial　utterance、10ng　after　tlley　become
redundant．　For　Cole（2010）they　are　goveming．　institutional　structures　wllich
in　some　sellse　hover　above　the　utterances　of山e　everyday．　As　such，　they　induce
incorporeal　transformations　and　adopt　a　de飢h－i11－life　presence　circulating
’around　institutions　places　of　education　like　the　routing　of　electricity　in
Plasterboard　walls？（P25）．　Order－words　sooll　pass　over　to　the　‘∫～le’・～t　oi’deノ”6ゾ’
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r17↓ηg∫，　as　Foucault　was　apt　to　say（Deleuze　and　Guattari、1987．　p96）．
　　　　Imperatives（commands，　orders，　injunctions）．　elln’eaties　and　requests、
are　performatives．　that　is　to　say，　a　fornl　of　speech　act　uttered　by　X　persoll　in　Y
circumstances．　whlch　compel　a　change　in　a　state　of　affalrs」nlpel’atives　can　also
be　fotmd　ill　declarative　and　descriptlve　sentences．　If．　for　Deleuze　and　Guattal’i．
the　primary　function　of　Ianguage　is　to　affect　others，　then　the　T　emits　speech
acts　in　self－expression　for　the’Fis　all　order－word　d　987．　P．84）、　On　this　suヒ）j　ect
and　writing　in　a　solo　work，　Deleuze　says　that　ill　the　act　of　speaking、　one　does
not　simply　indicate　things　and　actions．　but’commits　acts　that　assure　a　relation
with　the　interlocutor．　in　keeping　with　our　respective　situat▲ons．　The　vel’bs　I
command，　I　interrogate．　I　promise」ask．　a｜l　emit　speech　acts’（Deleuzeコ997、
P．73）．
　　　　Assessed　under　the　strictures　of　Jakobson’s　diagram　of　communication，
the　orde卜word「s　exertive　and　conative（the　vocative　or　imperative）elenlents
dominate　the　structure　of　the　speech　event．　In　Jakobson’s　fonnalist－functlonalist
model　of　communication，　which　is　structured　around　six　components－
addresser，　context．　message，　contact．　code，　and　addressee－six　functions
correspond　to　the　following：the　emotive，　the　referentia1，　tlle　poetic，　the　phatic，
the　metalingual，　alld　the　conative．　It　is　argued　that　in　any　communicative　event、
one　of　the　functions　takes　precedence　to　a　greater　or　lesser　extent　over　the
others－whell　one　considers　the　poim　of　view’of　the　observer．　The　full　meaning
of　the　speech　event　is　hence　considered　to　be　dependent　to　a　signi｛iicant　degree
on　the　context，　code．　or　nleans　of　contact、　and　the　combinations　which　ensue．
Tlle　meaning　of　a　message　is　grasped　in　the　total　act　of　communica〔ion，　whicll
entertains　distinct　extrahnguistic　factors　and　would　appear　comparable　to由e
social　relations　organised　by　the　coHective　asselnblage　of　enunciation．　Whlle
ill　Saussureぺs　work　there　is　a　distillction　between　Iangue　and　parole．　with
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langue　taken　as　the　systematic　homogelコeous　aspect　of　language，　and　parole　the
individual　use　and　val⇒iation、　in　Jakobson，　we　find　the　link　between　signifier　and
signified　Ioosed　to　take　bettel’accoun〔of　the　role　parole　plays．
　　　　Fundamentally．　primordial　communication　is　collsidered　to　be　the
transmission、　propagation　and　di∬emlllation　of　order－words．　Language　refers
llot　solely　to　paralinguistic　expre∬ion　or　extra－1inguishc　collcelll　s．、but　to　the
always－already　expre∬ed　which　opera忙s　from　‘saying　to　saying’（Deleuze
and　Guattari．198Z　p．7）．　The　operation　of〔｝le　order－word　functions　through
memory　and　the　memory　of　what　has　been　said　before．　There　is　cont　is【ent
correspondence　between　saying　and　saying．　We　can　also　find　this　idea▲11
Nietzsche’s　GeJ～ea～o、gy　ofル10’・‘ils（1967），　in　which　he　argues　that　memory　and
pain　are　inexlricably　linked　because　it　is　through　the　internalisation　of　pain　and
the　inscidption　of　pain　upon　the　body　that　it　comes　to　know　morality．
　　　　The　transmission　of　the　order－word　is　a　concrete　event，　and　as　such　its
effects　are　codified　ln　the　enunciation．　Drawing　on　the　speech－act　theory　of
Austin，　Deleuze　and　Guatta．ri　argue　that　the　efficacy　of　a　speech　act　is　derSved
not　ill　the　meanings　of　words　but　in　the　specifics　of　the　situation．　The　remit　of
speech　act　theory　is　therefore　extended　to　analyse　the　implicit　presupposition
or’ 唐?獅唐?u 盾?@a　statemenL　The　order－word　takes　notice　not　of　signification　or
semantics　per∫〈・but　the　vagaries　of　the　concrete　si．tuation　and　the　incorporeal
transfomlations　brought　imo　existence　and　acted叩on　the　body．　The　order－word
therefore　reinfol’ces　the　repelition　or　redundancy　of　production．
　　　　The　problem　of　nleaning　is　thus　perceived　as　inextricably　connected　to　the
question　of　specific　use．　In　terms　of　schooling　and　the　teaching　oflan．guage．
Deleuze　and　Guattari（1987．　p．75）claim　that　the　compulsory　education　machine
does　not　communicate　education．　Rather　it　imposes　upon　the　student’semiotic
coordinates’possessing　all　of　the　dual　foundations　of　gralllmar．　Put　another
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way．　the　collversatiolls　at　educational　in》titulions－determitie　bolh由e　sayable，
the　iterable．　as　well　as　theしmsayable　and　the　outlawed，　Moreover、　vocabu｜ary．
grammar、　rlletoric．　and　tone　of　voice　are　subject　to　the　same　detennination．
　　　　To　grasp　the　praglnatic　inteq〕retation　of　che　order－word，　il　is　importallr　to
see　Ihat　it　is　not　a　question　of　conscious　decision，　inteipretation　or　understanding
on　the　part　of　the　isolated　T．　With　Deleuze　and　Guattari　there　is　a　relentless
critique　of　the　centrality　of　the　subject　alld　the　sys〔eln　of　representation．
Tllere　is　no　axiological　or　existential　decision　to　disclose．　Weヤobey　bhIldly－
unthinkingly．　As　Deleuze　and　Guattari　say　language　is　made　Iiot　to　be　believed
but　to　be　obeyed．　and　to’complenlent　obedience’（1987．　P、7．｝．　Obedience　is　thus
perceived　as　the　honourmg　of　o1’der－words．　Likewise、　De　Landa（1993，　p、14）
argues　that　in　sniall　commun▲ties　social　rites　and　rules　develop　that　regis｛er
langし1age　as　a’badge　of　identity’and　ensure　that　dialect，　patois　and　minor
language　are　disseminated．
　　　　In　speaking　to　others．　we　transmit　to　them　what　we　have　been　told　to
say．　Order－words　or　slogans　are　the　cues、　prompts，　watchwords　and　passwords
－discontinuous　utterances－which　we　attach　and　avail　ourselves　to　as
representatives　of　this　or　that　discipline．　body　or　group．　Indirect　discourse
communicates　what　someone　has　heard　alld　what　someone　has　been　told　to　say．
The　order－words　command　the　informative　coment　of　se〔ltences．　Learning　a
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　L
language　would　then　seem　to　demand　a　blind　afflm．latiorl　of　the’g．enliQtig．　ation’
of　reality　derived　from　enforced　participation　in　social　Practices．　In　other　words．
we　carry　out　rules　to　a．void　social　exc［usion　and　ostracism，〔o　ward　ofi’the
threat　of　social　reprobatiol］、　to　escape　the　label　of　mad，1yin9．　stupid、　or　socially
dysfunctiollaL　We　obey．
　　　　In　the　schooL　the　gralllmar　teacher　lmparts　or～〃s～g’～5　knowledge　of　a　rule
to　be　fbllowed　c’θn・7pulsii・ε／y（Deleuze　and　Guattari、1987、　p．75）．　The　docilised
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body　is　u1lcollsCiOus　of　the’aboniinable　facultyl　instilled　into　it、　which　collsists．　in
‘emittill9．　recei、・illg　alld　trallsmitting　order－wor（ls‘ぱ987、　P．7）．　For　Cole，　order－
words　are　related　to　affect　a｜1d．　collcretely、　the　power　and　tone　of　the　teacheピs
voice．　as　well　as　factors　such　as’body　language　alld　institutional　identification
and　representation　of　pedagogヅ（2別Lp．6）．　The　language　of　orde1㌔words　ls　the
langvage　of　the　couitroom　and　of　the　law　and｛s　aki川o　Wittgensteilゴs　foml　of
life　and　language　games．This　processual　9．　enliotisation　observes　hngu▲stic　codes
for　social　rites　and　pl今agmatic　language　use　among　Peers　as　well　as　paralinguistic
expression　such　as　gesture．　facial　expression　and　posture，
　　　　In　sumnla：the　focus　on　exteriority　shows　language　does　not　operate
between　something　seen　and　somethillg　said、　but　relays　from　sayillg　to　saying，
Language｛s　connected　to　the　outside　because　the　dissemination　of　an　order－
word▲s　a　concrete　event．　dependent　upon　the　nature　of　the　collective　suhlect
of　enしmciation．　Deleuze　and　Guattari’s　theory　of　language　and　speech　acts
therefore　pertains　less　to　the　conveyallce　of　the　meanings　of　words　but　more
to　the　concrete　context　ill　question．　Lal19uage　apPears　to　presupPose　itself　for
ol⇒der－words　are　considered　codified　ill　everv　act　linked　to　statements　enforced
by　social　obli．gatioiエIt　is　this　point　which　reveals　Deleuze　and　Guattari’s
definition　of　language　as　such．　They　argue　that　language　is　the　set　of‘all　order－
wordsjmplicit　presupPositions、　ol－speech　acts　current　ill　a　given　language
at　a　given　momentl（1987．　p．79）．　Contra　Aus加，　indirect　discourse　is　primary
because　language．ア7θw∫through　subjects，9．　peaking　through　theln、　alding　the
regulation　and　ordering　of　the　life－world．　Language　is　read　as　speaking　in　and
through　suヒリects．　rather　than　bei．ng　spoken　by　them．　And　as　a　consequence　and
in　slmilar　fashion、　politics　affects　language　tlloroughly　from　within（Grisham、
1991．
j．
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Interlude：the‘rtraversed
　　　　In　the　next　part．　l　will　examine　Deleuze　and　GuattarVs　overarcl⊥ing　bid　to
eschew　the　linguig．　tics　concept▲on　of　su句ectivity　and　to　embrace　the　di∬olutlon
of　the　su切ecピDeleuze　and　Guattarゴs　philosophy　laしmches　a　fu▲l　scale　assault　oll
tlle　celltrality　of　the　hernietic　subject　and　singula正’ly　ailns　to’de［note　the　subject
from　its　central　position’（Lecercle，2002、　p．14L　In　other　words，　subjectivity
is　detemnined　by　effects．　In　the　place　of　the　9－　ubject．　impelφsonal　sillgular“y　is
fornied　through　connectjong．　with　other　singularities　ill　a　field　distributed（lbθllt
cl∫）ote〃／～α／．　For　Deleuze．　the　world　is　anarchic、’teeming‘with　allollylllouS、
imperg．　onal　individuations　and　pre－individual　singularities（which　are　terms
derived　from　the　philosophy　of　Gilbert　Simondon（1964））、　Singularities　are
not　illdividual　or　persollal　but　oversee　the　genesis　of　individual　and　persons．
Asingularity　is　constitutive　of　a　pre－individual　transcendental　field．　The
arrangement　of　sillg副arities　includes　persons　but　also　impersonal　collections
（Brott，2001）．　Guattari（1995．）asserts　that　pa由ic　subject▲vity　contests’rationalist，
capitalist　su旬ectivity句（p26）and　tlle　nature　of　the　latter▲s　such　that　the　fornler
pathic　and　affect　elelnents　are’systematically　circumvented’．’Non－humaゴ
aspects－ar仁music．　computer　technology，　educatiollal　alld　other　institutions，
and　the　media－are　key　elements　of　subjectivity　in　constant　formation　and
defo㎝ation．　He　argues　that　this　nonhuman　pre－persona1　form　of　subjectivity　is
the　crucible　of　hetei’ogenesis・
　　　　Thinking　through　the　sellse　of　the　haecceity，　thal　is　to　say、　a　thisnefs，
all　occurrence　or　hapPening，　aIl　hlnocence　of　becoming　or　rhizomatic　line　of
tlight，　Deleuze　and　Gua〔tari　consider　the　person　one　among　a　series　of　possible
individuations　such　as‘a　life，　a　season、　a　wind，　a　ba脈le，　five　o’c］ock’（Deleuze．
2006、p355）．　The／raec（ぞ～ぴis　a　certain．gatile∫“in，9　toRethe’・of　the　threads　of　jife
（IIlgold之008，　p．4）．　Moreover．　subjectivity　ig．　an　ef飴ct　of　impersonal　processes
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of　indjvidutitioi］．　Impei’sonal　effects－perceptiolls　or　emissions　of　t　ingularities
are　ir1’educible　to　the　lndividual　or　personaL　Deleuzビs　d995）interpretation
of　haecceity　suggests　a　radical　rethinkillg　of　subjectivity．　Discussillg　his
methodological　collaboration　with　Guattari．　he　says：’‘We’re　Ilot　at　all　sllre
we’re　persons∴（p．14D．　He　continues：“We’re　not　at　all　sure　we’re　persons：a
draft．　a　wind、　a　day．　a　tilne　of　day．　a　strean1．　a　place，　a　battle，　an　illness　all　have　a
nonpersonal　individuality．　They　have　proper　llames”，　adding．已㎏Our　individuality
is　rathei’that　of　events““ ip，141）．　In　Aη～∂lts〈1〃（∫Plate〈itfs（1987），　Deleuze　and
Guattari　posit　the　concept　of　haeccelty　as　precludillg　the　habit　of　saylng　T．The
’Fceases　to　be　a　subject　and　becollles　an　event　situated　in　assenlb［ages（P262｝．
The　authors　argue：“lt　is　the　emire　a∬elnblage　in　its　individuared　aggregate　that
is　a　haecceity．．．It　is　the　wolf　itself，　and　the　horse、　and　the　child，　that　cease　to
be　sublects　to　become　events，　ill　assemblages　that　are　inseparable　from　an　hour、
aseasol1．　an　atmosphere、　an　air、　a　hfe．　The　street　ellters　into　composition　with
the　horse．just　as　the　dying　rat　enters　illto　composition　with　the　air、　and　the　beast
and　the　full　moon　ellter　imo　composition　with　each　otheゴ’（p．262）．　For　Gtla“ari
（1996），the　T　is　always　already　a’multiplicity　within　oneself’（p．216）．
　　　　The‘▲ゼis　impersonal　ill　every　encounter．　The　poet　Lawrence　Ferlinghettrs
‘fourth　person　singular’d960）or　impersonal　discourse　is　also　used　to　dethrone
the　centrality　of　the’1’－the　9．　ubject　tllat　speaks　ill　its　owll　llame．　Fronl　this
perspective．　wha白s　sllown　is　the　murmur　ofト〃｝’α（／u　1‘〃79α9ε’or　there　ls
language、（see　Deleuze．1990、　p．118），There　is　no　speaker　or　author　but　a　system
of　utterances　or　enunciations－the　anonymous　murmur　of　theθIIρ‘～”～e．　For
example，　it　is　possible　to　think　through　the　anonynlity　of　the　biピin　the　following
description　of　the　battlet’ield：［the］　‘battle　hovers　over　its　own　field、　being
neutral　ill　relation　to　al】of　its　temporal　actuaiizations’（Deleuze、1990．　p」16）．　It
is　impassive　in　relation　to　the　victor　and　the、・anquished　or　the　coward　and　the
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brave．　It　is」ne＼er　presellt　but　always　yeuo　come　and　already　passeぱ（Deleuze、
1990、p．ll6）．　The　event　of　the　battle　provides　a　prism　through　whicll　to　access
tlle“fourth’ 垂?窒刀@on－‘a　genuinely　inハpersonal　diinension　where　everything　is
both　collective　and　private’（Marks．1998．　p．41）．
　　　　For　Deleuze，　when　we　speak，　a　palてicular　form　of　speech　speaks　through
us．　In　our　time．　that　is　to　say，　the　tinle　of　M’e／7iode〃ls，　what　speaks　is　not　the
individua1，　person　or’sea　without　difference「but　a　world　of　pre－individuaL
impersona］singularities、　wh▲ch　are　nlobi］e　and　nomadic．　The　fourth　persoll
is　somehow　entwined　witll　a　tlowin9，　intensive，　pre－subject▲ve』I　feer．　While
differentiated　from　the　everydayness　and　idle　speech　of　the　Heideggerian〃ie
r1招y（1962）．　it　palてakes　of　its　impersonality，　b‘it　is　the＞they“of　impersonal　and
pre－individual　singularities、　the　’they“of　the　pure　evellt　whereill　it　dies　in　the
same　way　thaいt　rains．　The　splendor　of　the」they’is　the　splendor　of　the　event
itself　or　of　the　fourth　persoバ（Deleuze．1990，　p．152）．　The　event　cluCI　language
is　devoid　of　su句ectivity．　Rather．　it　is　embedded　in　the　impersonal　language　of　a
kind　of　rustlin9〃yo“here　is）or　the恒fourth　persoll　singula1”．　SiIlgularity　then
is　loaded　with　all　impel’sonal　power　that　forms　local　connections　to　produce
t1’ansformation　upon　the　body　of　the　subject，　that　is　to　say，　to　produce　a　relay
of　subjectivation－desu司ectivation．　In　questioning　tlle　concept　of　person（1990，
p．14D．　Deleuze　cites　a　drah．，　a　wind、　a　day，　a　time　of　day，　a　stream、　a　place、
abattle．　or　an　illness　as　haecceities　which　possess　nonpersonal　individuality
and　a　proper　name．　He　goes　so　far　as　to　say　that　individuality　as　sucll　belongs
more　to　that　of　the　evenl（P．14D．　The　collcept　of　haecceity　avoids　the　habit　of
saying　T、　of　speaklllg　in　olle「s　own　name．　It　ceases　lo　be　a　subject　but　rather
solicits　evellts　ill　assemblages（Deleuze　and　Guattari，1987．　p262）．　Put　another
way，　ill　discussing　the　role　of　affect　oll　subjectivity　ill　the　essayノ～～toノ’ll　C）〃θ∫〈〃～d
ET．ristential　AObc’ts，　Guattari（1996）claims　that　affects　ellgage　tlle　memory　and
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cognition、　with　the　result　that　the’ris　assaulted　alld　deserted　of　inter▲ority．　It　is
but　a　tributarジto　a　multi－headed　enunciative　lay－ouピ（p．160＞．　He　goes　on　to　say
thauhe　T　which　speaks　ill　tlle　f▲1’st　person　becomes　a‘tluctuating　illtersectiolゴ、
alld　a’tenninal：1’or　consciousne－ss．1ndividuation　is　therefore　an　infinite　process
or　collstant　movement　It　is　productive　ofしmtimely　becomings．　A　haecceity　is
always　illtersticiaL　geometric　and　abstract（Deleuze　and　Guattari、1987、　p263）．
The　idea　is　borrowed廿om　Bergson，　who　in　his　7↓～・θsθ1〃て’es〔～f1　MoJ’σ～ぬ・αノ～d
”c7〃8～oノ～（1935）、　describes　the　effect　of　music．　Bergsoll　says：｝Mlen　music　cries、
it　is　hum頷ity，　it　is　the　whole　of　nature　which　cries　with　it．　Truly　speaking、　it
does　not　introduce　these　feelings　in　us；it　illtroduces　us　rather　into　them、1ike　the
passers－by　that　mig．ht　be　nudged　in　a　dallce（Bergson，1935、p．30）．
Direct　discourse
　　　　Direct　discourse　is　derivative　fronl　the‘anonymous　murmuピ（Deleuze，
1988．p」8），　and　retrieved　after　the’dismembermeI1ピof　tlle　collective
assemblage（1987、　p．84）、　Reported　speech　is　precisely　the　murnlur　from　which
the　T　assumes　a　propeT　name　as　it　draws　from　the　consteliation　of　voices　to
compose　its　own，　Deleuze　and　Gua腫ari　compare　the　collective　assemblage　to
the　murmur　from　which　the　T　takes　its　proper　name（1987，　p．84．）．　Utterances
in　an　aノソ’‘〃．79εη～et～t　I’efer　not　to　the　subject　of　the　statemellt　because　Deleuze
discerns‘subjecti貸catioll　processes’at　work　in　the　arrallgements．
　　　　The　pragmatics　of　the　order－word　therefore　considers　the　said　as
subordinate　and　dependent　on　what　is　being　done　in　saying　it　The　focus　is　llot
on　the　construction　of　meaning　in　selltences　possessed　with　declarative　force
but　what　is　honed　in　upon　is　the　force　of　language　and　the　ensuing　incorporeal
transformations　brought　into　being　through　speech－acts．　For　example，
incorporeal　transfomlations　are　engendered　in　the　courtroom　when　the　accused
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is　convicted　by　the　judge，　who　in　solemn　performs　the　mteralコce　sl　sentence
you　to　life　impl’isollment’、’I　sentence　you‘carries｛llocutionary　force　as　il
instantaneously　trallsforms　the　body　of　the　accused　into　the　body　of　the℃onvicゼ．
Moreove1’，　saying’I　love　you！fOl’Bakl〕till　and　Deleuze　expresses　the　condition
of　the　sellse　of　the　stateinent　and　a　real　detemiination　of　the　states　of　bodies　and
intervenes　directiy　into　the　actiolls　and　passiolls　that　define　them（Deleuze　and
Guattari、1987，　p．82）、
　　　　Order－words－through　the　strange　characteristics　of　the　inslantaneousness
of　their　emission，　perception　and　transmission（Deleuze　and　Guattah，1987．　p．84）
－also　entrea杜he　accused　to　speak　ln　his　own　narne　without　volition　ol・will．　This
is　the　verdict　or　death－sentence．　The　accused　must　speak　for　silence　implicates．
Yet　the　accused　who　stands　on　his　or　her　own　and　speaks　in　his　or　her　own　name
succumbs　to　a　process　of　subjectification，　which　1『elays　between　both　subjection
and　su句ugation．　Similar［y，　the　accused　can　be　convicted　by　public‘ゴo－vαwhellce
sanctioned　by　the　Imass－medjaactq（1987，　P．90），
　　　　Indirect　discourse　or　narrative　pertains　not　to　communicating　the　visible
but　in　transmitting　the　audible，what　llas　been　repolてed－in　other　words’hearsay「
d987、　p．76）．　We　can　take　hearsay　to　mean　chchξ（．Porter．2003　and　2010）．
Perhaps　another　way　of　thinking　this　is　to　consider　the　Lsaying　to　saying’as
the　repetitioll　of　clich6，　the　bana】everyday　talk　of　Heidegger’s〃～e　clノ～〔）〃y〃．7〃tt．y
rhe．v．　Heidegger　interprets　common　knowledge　as　a　multiplicity　of　statements
that　circulate．　tllat　is　picked　up　and　passed　ol1廿om　one　to　another．　The　speakers
appear　as　simple　relay　points，　equivalent　and　interchangeable　with　one　another．
Yet，　the　talk　does　not　circulate　anonymously．　but　is　always　directed．　Statemellts
are　taken　up　and　repeated　siniply　because　they　have　beell　iterated　before、　because
anyone．　everyone，〃～e　tノ～εy、　says　theni．　In　tllis　sellse　again、　no　person　speaks　in
their　owTI　name．　no　one　takes　res　ponsibility　fOr　what　is　said　or，　as　Deleuze　say
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elsewhere．‘lw］henever　we　wl’ite，　we　speak　as　someone　else＿Today、　however、
we　are　uncovering　a　world　of　pre－indiN・idual、　impersonal　singularities．　They　are
llot　reducjble　to　individua！s　or　persons、110r　to　a　sea　without　difference．　These
singularihes　are　niobiie．　they　break　in、　thieving　alld　stealillg　away、　alteniating
back　and　fo1てh、　hke　anarchy　crowned、　inhabiting　a　nomad　space“（2004．　p．143）．
Here、　eyes　are　askance　to　the　Levinasian　conception　of　speech　as　an　address
and　commalld　fl’oll｝the　site　of　alterity．　The　mしllmlul’ing　indeterminacy　of　idle
speech　resembles　background　noise．　There｛s　but　an　anonymous　mumlur　which
al1’で一iteiマate．　As　a　reading　of　the　niaterialわ（」siSρデ～（〃lgtla，ge（li～d　the▲mpersonai
fotlll　Lone　speaks’．the　pragmatics　of　the　order－word　analyg．　es　social　relations　as
both　prior　to　syntax　and　senlalltics　and　prior　to　infomiation　and　commullication．
Impersonal　or　background　words　enlerge　prior　to　their　enunciation　in　the　first
pe「son・
　　　　Reflecting　this　focus　in　his　oeuvre、　Deleuze　in　Negotiati‘〃～∫（1995）．　says　he
and　Guattari　were　strict　funct▲onalis．　ts　because　they　were　essentially　interested
in　how　something　works（p．2D．　Froln　this　we　can　extract　the　idea　that　as’strict
functionalists’they｜・e．ject　the　concept　of‘ideology’、　which　for　them　has　never
existed日987．　P．4）．　In　its　place，　there　is　but　the　funcnollillg　of　order－words、
which　like　Badiou’s　event　appear　like　lightiiiiig，　full　of　promise　and　mischief，
rich　in　perlocurionary　effect．　The　events　f1ash　mornentarily　and　explode　before
fadlng　away、　b＜アbi’eわeingノ～）J’，g・（一’）惚｝・～．　Order－wordsゴor　Deleuze　and　Guattari．by
their　very　nature　pemit’one　to　feel　absolved　of　the　slogalls　one　has　followed
alld　then　abandoned　to　welcome　others＞（1987、　p．84）．
　　　　Words　are　innumerable、　but　what　do　they　mean？Words　are　many，　but
what　do　they　do？The　utterance　of　them　is　part　of　a　constellat▲on　of　always－
already　received∂o．vα．　Tlle　poillt　is　that　order－words　are　essentially　evacuated　of
nコealling　and　only　ever　receive　a　cursory　allalysis　of　their　content　It　is　enough
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that　they　are　obeyed．　Thls　contennon　connectg．　with　the　idea　of　ideo】ogy　and　the
repetition　of　the　sanle．　Order－wol“ds　folnl　a　panern　of　clich6s　ulldergirded　by
innumerable　othel・S．
Tb　shudder
　　　　In　Deleuze　and　Guattarビs↓W～clt　1∫1）ノri／θsθi）ノ～y？d994）．　thei’e　is　a
discenlible　critique　of　the　troubling　desire　for】universals　of　commullicatioll’，
They　say　one　ought　to‘shudder’at　this　desi｜℃as　it　bespeaks　of　a　wil］to　excess
－an　excess　of　communication（1994．　p．7｝．　Deleuze　and　Guattari　retum　to
the　problem　of　communication　and　perceive　it　as　the　enemy　of　creativity、　In
acommentary　oll　the　pel’ceived　theft　of　creativity　from　academic　discourse，
Deleuze　and　Guattari　say：”［T］he　most　shameful　momem　came　when
computer　science．　marketing，　design，　and　advertising，　al▲the　disciplines　of
communication．　seized　hold　of　the　word（・θノ？（・ept　itself　and　said：’This　is　our
concem、　we　are　the　creative　ones，　we　are　the　ideas　Mc）J．2．’We　are　the　friends　of
tlle　concept，　we　put　it　in　our　computers”　（1994．　p．10）．　Theii’objection．　it　would
appearjs　focussed　on　the　extent　to　which　the　industries　of　communication　and
infornlation，　seemingly　erase　g．　e］f－reflection　and　critique　of　the　very　assumptions
oftheir　entelprise．　Contra　the　process　of　communication　as　pure　commullicatioll
of　itself．　the　idea　is　to　re－engineer　and　rescue　life－affirnling　critique．　Deleuze
and　Guattarピs　views　are　consistent　with　the　dromological　focus　of　Vi．rilio
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　し
（2005）．who　claims　the　compulsion　to　communicate　is　a　form　of　immobilily　and
disappearance．
　　　　Elsewhere、　in　a　discussion　with　Toni　Negri　entit］ed℃ontrol　and
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　」
Beconling’Deleuze（1995）sketches　a　prescient　analysis　of　the　change　from
disciplinary　to　contro正societies．　Control　societies、　he　says，　no　longer　operate　by
confinh19　people　to　set　spaces　and　parameters　but　operate　through　continuous
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control　and　ins｛ant　communication．　Faced　witlハthis　prospect，　Deleuze　calls
for　the　hi．iacking　of　speech　because　creatillg　is　considered　essentially　different
from　commしmication　d　995、　p．175）．　Although　perhaps　arguing　from　a　different
political　and　philosophical　poillt　of　view、　this　epoch6　and　critique　of　vacuous
comlllullication　is　siniilarly　echoed　by　phibsopher　Sloterdijk（2006、　p．84）who
believes　that　more　communlcation　means　above　all　else　moi・e　（・θ’η」7i（・t（see
Zizek．2010）．
　　　　In　Deleuze’s　societies　of　control，　the　code　is　the　key．　It　is　the　password
rather　tha川he　watchword〔hat　grants　passage．　Codes　mark　access　to　infomlation．
On　this　poinしDeleuze（1992）says：L‘We　no　longer　find　ourselves　dealing
with　the　mass／individual　pair．　Individuals　have　become　dividuals，　and　masses．
samPles．　data．　markets，　or　banks∴
　　　　Deleuze’s　critical　view　of　the　widespread　intoxication　with　vacuous
communication　in　control　societies　discerns　many　dallgers　lurking　ill　the
universals　of　communication．　Thinking　in　ternls　of　the　desire　to　desire
repression、　he　que　9・　ti　ons　the　thirst　to　be　forever　connected　and’infernally’
creative　and　productive．　In　a　sense　there　is　too　much　communication．　We
modems　do　Ilot　lack　communication，　Deleuze　and　Guattari　claim，　f（）r　we　have
too　niuch　of　it．　What　is　absent　is　futural　orientation：“We　jack　creation．　We　lack
resistance　to　the　presenピ’日994，　p．108）．　What　is　missing　is　a　people　yet　to　come．
This　proclamation　clearly　contests　the　Habelmasian　communicational　Inodel　of
express▲on　which　assumes　the　centrality　of　the　rational　T、　tlle　subjec〔－object
dualism．　the　free　congregatioll　of　illtel’－subjectivity　and　the　possibility　of　open
and　transparent　of　information．
　　　　Exhorting　the　populous　to　find　ways　to　evade　control、　Deleuze　d995）
perhaps　sends　a　message　to　a　people　yet　to　come　or　for　a　people　not　yet　ready
to　hear　in　order　to　create　‘vacuoles　of　rloll－communication’or　circu▲t　b1・eakers
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to　elude　caph11’e（p，175）．　What　ls　vabrised　is　the　blocklllg　of　codes　or　anti－
production　as　all　anticipation　of　the　production　of　the　inauguraL　But　without
apeople　to　perform　a　d6tournement　apropos　conユmunication．　do　we　not　elld
mpessimism　and　despair？Let　us　look　at　Lingis（2010）who　challellges　this
pe∬imism　alld　sees　ill　the　relation　with　tlle　other　all　el）iphany　of　full　all（l　presel．lt
commu．nlcatloll、
Order－word　and　phenomenology
　　　　Amore　optimistic　interpretation　of　the　order－word　can　be　derived　from
Lillgis’s　maverick　phenomenological　w1’itillg、　which　whne　cr“lcal　of　the　modeI
of　communication　as　a　relay　of　information．　considers　the　order－word　as　a
moment　of　fundamental　understandillg　between　selves．　Phenomenologically、
Lillgis（2010）argues．　communication　is　the　exchange　of　information　for　it　i．s
through　the　order－words（or　the　password　as　l　understand　it）that　humans‘utter
words　of　welcome　and　camaraderie，　give　and　receive　clues　and　w飢chwords
as　how　to　behave　among　them　and　among　others．　gossip，　talk　to　amuse　one
another’（2010，　p」5）．　He　argues　that　the　other　is　before　the　T　not　to　issue
meaningful　propositions　but　as　an　agency　that‘orders　us　alld　apPeals　to　us’
（pp」5－16）．　This　fundamental　commullication　exceeds　the　transmission　and
reception　of　signs　sent　fヤom　olle　ego　to　another．　Commullication　is　more　than
the　translation　of　packets　of　data．
　　　　For　Lingis，　Serres’theory（正982）depicts　a　model　of　rational　conmunity
and　conlmunication　wllich　operates　as　a　phanrasmagoria　of　harmonious
dialogic，　through　the　purging　and　eradication　of　noise．　Such　a　theory　maps　a
nlilieu　in　which　digitally　ellcoded　infolnコation　and　data　is　instantly　graspable
but　only　through　the　jamming　of　the　equivocal　voice　of　the　outsider．　ln　this
ideal　republic，　Serres　clainis　that　communication　is　iIldeed　possible　as　the
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Lr　and　other　are　trained　to　code　and　decode　llleallillg　by　usUlg　the　same　key．
Communication　is　the　said．　the　dematerialised．　lnterpreted　hl　thi．s　way，　for
Sen’es．〔he　paragoll　is　two　modenls、　transmittillg　and　receiving　infolτnation－bits
simultalleously．　However．　for　Lingls、　ill　the　city　of　communicatioll　maximaily
purged　of　lloise．　universai．　unequivocal　comn〕ulllcation　woしtld　assunle　the
horrific　fornコoF　a　transpa1’ellt　albeit　machiiiic，　inter－subjectiv▲ty、　whicl〕he
interprets　as　a　plot　to　eliniinate　the　other、　a　killcl　of　homicidal　xenophobia．　As
he　says’the　will　to　eliminate．110ise　is　an　eff’ort　to　silence　the　interlocutor　qua
outsider、（Lingis．1994．　P．97）．
　　　　If　the　pragmatism　of　Deleuze　and　Guattari　can　act　as　a　prism　to　think　the
ullcol）scious　investment　in　the　socius、　Lillgis　colltends　that　while　there　seems
no　question　of　escaping　order－words，011e　can　f］ee　the　death－sentence　and　the
verdict　tlley　infiict　upon　the　body．　Phellomenologically、　the　T　who　speaks　in　its
own　name，　Lillg▲s　says，　does　not　operate　through　the　will　to　disclose　or　denude
itself　ill　a　mallller　of　an　epiphany　or　nloment　of　Heideggerian　authellticity．
Rather．　as　words　colmect　with　other　words、　and　statemellts　support　other
statenlents，　ihe　已F　mat　speaks　reaches　back　to　the　subject　of　the　statelnents：
The　T　says　and　what　is　said　generates　fu1寸her　statements．　For　Lingis．　authentic
speech　is　not　simPly　a　soliloquy　before　the　night　of　deatll，　so　to　speak，　but　in
speakillg　in　one’s　one　nanle　one　disconllects　fronl　a　vital　environment　and　in
doing　l　o　delinlits　one‘s　possibilit▲es　as　a　process　of　subjectificatio1工subjection
and　subjllgatiOll（2006｝．
Mots　d”ordre　or　mots　de　d6sordre
　　　　Given　the　scope　of　its　ellte1’prise．　linguistics．　for　Deleuze、　has　done　a
lot　of　harm（／α〃ノ？gz∫1∫r砲’e〈i　．fとlit　heattc’oi’1）‘～〈・η～‘〃）、　especially　because　of
its　concentrat▲oll　on　the　universals　of　gramInar　alld　the　fuiコctional－cognitive
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paradign1．　Instead．　t’or　Deleuze，　the　task　of　a　more　general　linguistic　exercise　is
to　interrogate　the　concrete　exigencies　tlirough　whicll　the　order－word　is　uttered
alld　to　reveal　the　password　as　residing　in　every　order－word　4u‘l　potentiaL
The　password　calTies　the　capacity　to　exceed　the　llnlits　of　the　always－alread｝f
circunコSCribed，
　　　　WhiIe　the　order－word　foiTns　part　of　the　apparatus　of　capture、　the　passw’ord
is　erected　as　a　means　to　escape　the　strata　alld　correspollds　to　the　experilnental
use　of　lallguage．　In　some　not　altogether　straightforwai’d　way，　i日ies　behind、
perhaps　above　and　beyond．　perhaps　lurking　ullderneath　order－words．　The
．fdわu1‘～tive，ルη（・τ’〔フ∫．70f　the　password（Deleuze．】997）offers　a　trajectory　of
flight　and　proffers　the　hope　of　a　peop／e　y〈1ω〈10nlC」．　It　is　therefore　futural　and
expressive　of　a　power　that　is　capable　of　ahering　and　immediately　inlpacting
the∫o（1ius　to　engendel’change．　The　password　throws　colltellt　and　expressioll
into　disarray，　making　it　impossible　to　determine　the　limits　of　the　possible．
The　password　is　difference　in　itseIf，　fomed　ill　the　immallence　of　productioI1．
Its　fUllCtiOII　and　matter　circulate　and　illteract　on　the　plane　of　consistency．　It
breaks　open　both　words　and　things．　The　password　is　multimodal：it　call　fomコ
in　a　variety　of　modes－in　music，　video　alld　tlle　textual．　It　is　connective　of
difference、　bringing　different　realms　into　contact、　engendering　new　directions
and　possibilities、　While　the　order－word　oy’er－deter面lles　the　relations　of　control
within　the　strata，　the　password　as　its　ever　present　other　registers　the　excess　of
surplus　value－it　fractul’es」t｛s　all　experiment．　If　passwords　do　llot　re－present
the　world，　they　do　in　some　sense　reshape　and　reconstitute▲t　in　material　ways．
The　questioll　is　how　to　elude　the　death－sentence　of　the　order－word　so　as　to
experiment　with　ihnes　of　fllght　that　do　not　fiair　out　or　self－immolate．　For　Lingis，
it　is　when　we　speak　in　our　name（Lingis、1997），　when　we　take　I’espollsibility　for
what　is　said　and　colmect　with　intensities　and　the　othemess　of　the　other．　that　we
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set　ill　motion　passwords　which　evade　control．　It　is　tl〕e　password　which　disi’upts
the　mots‘／’ρJ’c／i’e　and　sets　in　traill　relays　and　transversal　niachines　to　inlpinge
upon　the　smooth　relays　of　barking　orders，
　　　　For　Blanchot日993、　p．xvi），　there　ls　a‘background句behind　words、　whose
mumコuring　i）ltelTul〕ts　the　lltterances　of　the　everyday．　The　passwords　of　which
Deleuze　and　Guattari　speak　of　bear　close　resemblance　to　Blallchoピs‘disorderly
words’、　words　which　are】free　of　discourse’（Blallchot　in　Holland，1995）、　Similar
to　the　timeliness　of　the　s｜ogalls　articulated　prior　to　the　begilmillg　of　the　Russian
Revolution，　the　slogalls　orη～ots〈ieゴ4∫ご〃’di’e　on　the　Parisian　walls　of　l968
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　」
（lppec〃’‘〃πノdis〈～ρρ‘・α’・in　a　circuit　of　inlnlediacy　and　contemporaneity（Blanchot
in　Holland，1995、　p．204）．　They　have　a　transitory　and　ephemeral　hfespan　tied　to
the　decision　to　act　resolutely．　the　decision　to　say　something　in　one　one’s　name
in　the　h～（・et川〃・1（1：with　the　act　of　saying　deemed　more　important，　for　Blanchot，
than　the　actual　content　of　the　said（Blanchot，1988，　P．30）．　In　theεv6’．～eme〃ts　of
May　l968，　the　meanillg　of　the　slogan’all　power　to　the　Soviets’is　transfomed
into‘all　power　to　the　imagination’．　Thel’e　is　a　playfulness　of　language，　a
scrambling　of　the　order－words　and　mocking　of　the　barking　of　comniands，　The
writing　on　the　walls．　Blanchot　says，　is　neither　inscriptional　or　elocutionary．　The
posters　do　not　need　to　be　read　in　the　conventional　sense　but　exist　to　challenge
all　Iaw．　The　disorderly　words　accompany　the　rhythm　of　our　steps，　They　are
words　which　question．　appeal　and　threaten　but　leave　with　haste　without　waiting
for　a　reply（p．204）．　There　is　a　hyphenat▲on　of　a　disaster，　of　all　astral　change，
accordillg　to　Blanchot（Holland，　p204）．　As　Blanchot　says：
Tracts．　posters、　bulletins；street　words．　infinite　words；it　is　not　some　concem　for
effectiveness　that　makes　them　necessary．　Whether　effective　or　not、　they　belong
to　the　decjsion　of　the　moment．　They　appear，　they　disappear．　They　do　llot　say
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everytllil19、　on　the　contrary　they　ruin　everythin9，　they　are　outside　everythil19，
They　act　and　reflect　fragme1．ハtarily．　They　leave　no　trace：they　are　a　trait　without
trace．　Like　the　words　oll　the　walls、　they　are　writtell　in　insecurity、　received　under
thre飢，　are　themselves　the　bearers　of　danger，　then　pass　with　the　passer－by　who
passes　them　oll、　loses　them　or　foI’gets　them（Holland、1995．p205），
Takell　another　way　thel1、　the　password　is　that　which　contests　the　cycle　of
machillic　r6p6titionη20’・r汚’・e　or　the　deadly　cycle　of’・c・pE・titio」一～and　self－
immolation（GuattarL　2000．　p．39）．　It　questions　and　undemiines　the　impel’atives
implicit　in　death　sentences．　It　is　through　flight．　becoming－nomadic　and
molecular，　the　illnocence　of　becolning、　tllat　we　find　the　expression　of　active　aηd
creative　attributes，　of　active　and　reactive　forces．　The　password　is　a　word　that
fornls　a　component　of　passage．　If　o1・der－words　enforce　stoppages，　their　underside
may　also　conjure　up　creativity　and　beco面ng．　It　is　therefore　a　question　of
isolating　and　fostering　the　password　through　modifying　the　formation　of　orders
into　conlponents　of　passage（Deleuze　and　Guattari．1987，　p，　I　l　O）．
　　　　But　this　is　precisely　the　problem　of　how　we　come　to　speak　ill　oul’name．
It　is　unclear　what　the　password　unlocks　or　gives　access　to．　How　do　we　judge
il　is　the　righuime｛o　speak　in　our　name　if　illdeed　to　do　so　is　to　impinge　upon
ourselves　a　millor　death　sentence？Or　taken　aiiothei－wayjs　in　speaking　in　our
own　nan．le　an　irnplicit　concession　to　the　alte1’ior　commalld　to　denude　ou1’selves
to　the　othemess　of　tlle　other？In　tems　of　pedagogy．　if　tlle　cues、　watchwords、
and　passwords　order　and　colllpel　the　sωden杜o　speak　and　when　to　speak、　what
is　the　job　of　the　teacher？How　can　the　teacher　jam　the　tmthinkhlg　repetition　of
the’abonlinable　facu｜ty「which　emits．　receives　and　transmlts　order　words？If
the　studenピs　job　is　to　write　down　oll　the　exam　paper　what　has　been　understood．
wha〔is　the　teacher“s‘）For　Deleuze　and　Guattari、　the　teacher’s　role　is　to　extracr
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from　the　message　an　opening　fissu｜・e　or　becoming．　This　ethology　of　the
classroom　would　honour　the　injunction　to　1’emaill　vigilant　to　the　serendipitous
ellcoulltel’that　brings　to　hfe　the　thoughts　and　affects　and　considerations　of　the
pupil．　It　brings　o山of　to叩01－apositive　affilmation　of　life．　In　Deleuze．　there
is　a　fundamental　questioning　of　the　critical　and　creatjve　nature　of　thought．　an
exegesis　of　thought　that　is　affirmati、・e　yet　dissensuaL　This　excess　acts　as　a
cil’cuit　breaker　to　distort　the　codes、　to　jam　orthodoxy　and　do．x』o：to　put　into　effect
war－lnachines　of　a　literary　tlatul－e　to　elltreat　others　to　become－other、　to　contest
the　limits　of　received　opinion．
　　　　In　conclusion，　we　have　seen　that　Deleuze　and　Guattarピs　account　of
language　is　all　a〔tempt　to　thillk　otherwise　thall　the　Saussurean　system　of
signifier　and　signified　or　Chol．nsky叫s　universal　grammar．　Deleuze　and　Guattari’s
theol’y　of　linguistics　tends　to　focus　on　the　unconscious　processes　at　work　which
reinforce　nolnls　and　behaviour　in　society．　In　sonle　way　it　helps　us　to　understand
the　inscriptions　upon　and　relations　between　bodies、　The　analysis　of　becoming－
millor，　of　the　stutte1’illg　and　stammering　of　minor　languages、　offers　a　way　to
think　otherwise　than　the　major　language　of　representation．　For　it　is　the　minor
l．anguage－or　the　foreign　language　within　one’s　own　mother　tongue－which
breaks　open　a　passage　in　the　order－word　to　refoml　the　redundallcies　of　the　majol’
tongue，
　　」
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